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The Helmholtz Maneuver, or
The Idea of (Honors in)
a University
RICHARD ENGLAND
SALISBURY UNIVERSITY

Whoever, in the pursuit of science, seeks after immediate practical utility may generally rest assured that he will seek in vain.
—Hermann von Helmholtz

W

hat does honors offer the university that supports it? On the NCHC listserv this summer, a plea for help came from a colleague whose university was considering dropping its honors program. As budgets grow tight,
small, expensive honors programs become vulnerable, and their defenders
need arguments that administrators can hear and understand. Most campuswide honors programs offer a general-education-based curriculum.
Unfortunately, few campus units defend the idea of general education as a
whole although they may fiercely guard their particular piece of it. At many
schools, campus-wide honors is one of the few academic programs to be rooted in a part of the curriculum often regarded as a necessary evil; as such, it
has few allies. However, if general education is really important, then bright
students need and deserve a special course of study in this area that can help
them develop the habits of mind and abilities that it has long been intended
to produce.
Education is like science in that it is often thought to be worth pursuing
because of its practical results. The promoters of STEM education are primarily interested not in the coherence or beauty of scientific theories but in
the economic importance of applied science and technology. As the great
German philosopher, physicist, and psychologist Hermann von Helmholtz
noted in 1862, however, there is a catch to the pursuit of economic success
through science: hunting for “immediate practical utility” rarely works. The
unspoken argument here is that the pursuit of science for its own sake, unfettered by commercial concerns, ultimately pays off in useful if unexpected
ways. Helmholtz’s maneuver has been undertaken by champions of basic scientific research to the present day. Through his interest in physiological
optics, for instance, Helmholtz invented the ophthalmoscope in 1851, and his
many contributions to mathematical physics and the philosophy of science
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helped to create the conditions for the revolutions in early twentieth-century
physics with their practical outcome, atomic fission. Like Helmholtz, scientists like Einstein, Bohr, Rutherford, and others started out wanting only to
discover how nature worked. They did not aim to change the course of the
twentieth century.
The same relationship we see between pure and applied science is present in ideas about education. Naturally we hope that education is useful, but,
if we educate only for “immediate practical utility,” we get a different result
than what we commonly expect from university study. At most four-year colleges, about a third of a student’s coursework is still given over to general or
liberal education even though the perennial debate continues between those
who see education’s value in terms of its usefulness and those who defend
learning for its own sake. In tight economic times, utility and the bottom line
loom large in the political and popular imagination. Nonetheless, we offer a
general education, especially in honors, without reference to immediate usefulness because we believe that it serves an important purpose.
Is honors frivolous? Have a glance at the titles that grace the sample syllabus page of the NCHC website: “Monsters and Marvels,” “The Seven
Deadly Sins,” and “Sex, Freud and Morality” all sound interesting, but not
immediately useful. While there are honors programs in professional programs such as nursing and education, for many students the norm for honors
is the college-wide program with a curriculum that generally substitutes for
some or all general education requirements. The courses might form a coherent core sequence, shaped by the logic of a particular approach to historical,
philosophical or social themes, or they might offer a constantly changing
array of idiosyncratic topics developed by a rotating pool of professors
recruited to teach for honors. Regardless of the model, most students experience honors as members of small classes discussing big questions with little
regard to immediate utility.
This focus on ideas rather than utility is currently a problem because the
attention of politicians (and so university administrators) is focused on making higher education lead directly to success in the “real world.” The rhetorical implication is that poetry, history, and culture come from a different planet than the laws of nature and economics (philologists are from Mars?). As
low-enrollment programs with a tenuous connection to the reification of
“reality” are cut, champions of honors should ask themselves what, if anything, they can say to defend the usefulness of honors to the university.
A decade before Helmholtz warned against the exclusive pursuit of utility in science, John Henry Newman, newly appointed as rector of the
Catholic University of Dublin, made a similar appeal in his Idea of a
University (1852). Then as now, various advocates debated the purpose of a
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higher education, and many criticized the impractical, useless model of education at Oxford. In his classic response to this attack, Newman elucidated a
conception of university education that has been influential ever since.
Education for a particular profession or vocation, Newman argued, is by its
very nature the means to an end: the making of money or the training of a particular kind of professional, for example. Such a vocational education is
servile since it serves an end other than itself (88–90). A liberal education, on
the other hand, has no such ulterior purpose or use. Quoting Aristotle,
Newman noted that while useful possessions “bear fruit,” liberal possessions
are used only for their own sake, and when they are used “. . . nothing accrues
of consequence” (89). A liberal education is the pursuit of knowledge for its
own sake and for the pleasure it gives the mind. While the useful arts and sciences are to be praised for the goods they bring, Newman claims that a liberal education, although pursued for its own sake, brings about a desirable end
in the kind of knowledge it grants the learner.
The knowledge Newman defends is “informed, or . . . impregnated by
reason” (91); it is a habit of mind that allows its possessor to properly balance
differing perspectives and that “sees more than the senses convey; . . . reasons
upon what it sees . . . [and] invests it with an idea. It expresses itself, not in a
mere enunciation, but by an enthymeme” (92). This vision of the power of
rational knowledge makes it an active faculty rather than a substance that can
be picked up and redistributed. It is, Newman insists, “an acquired illumination, . . . a habit, . . . and an inward endowment” (93). In the twenty-first century we talk about the power of life-long learning or the importance of having critical-thinking skills. These concepts seem to have evolved from
Newman’s conception of a dynamic power that the liberally educated learner
possesses. In honors programs we foster conversations that seek to bring out
a critical power in students that they can apply to questions in any field; we
seek to make students part of a community of scholars who enjoy learning for
its own sake; and we aim to make honors students the kind of independent
seekers of truth who apply their “acquired illumination” to research projects
that bridge the gap between the theoretical and the practical.
A liberal education can, of course, make a student better able to undertake any number of other activities, including useful professions. Having a
habit of mind that allows one to focus disciplined reason on any particular
problem can only be an asset, particularly in a rapidly changing world like
Newman’s or (a fortiori) our own. A liberal education is part of a formation
of character and intelligence that students need, and this justification is often
offered today for the existence of general education classes. As the quotation
from Helmholtz implies, economically valuable discoveries in science will
follow from the disinterested pursuit of pure, theoretical knowledge.
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Similarly, Newman suggests, a powerful mind will be able more easily to
realize all sorts of practical goals, but such a mind is the product of a course
of study that seeks knowledge for its own sake.
To those who argue that a liberal education is a pleasant luxury but too
expensive to pay for given current exigencies, the Helmholtz/Newman tradition provides a compelling answer. If we turn our attention to solely practical
ends for education, we will, paradoxically, undermine the very habits of mind
that have enabled us to turn our learning to valuable account. We can create
an army of workers with particular vocational skills that may serve the needs
of the moment, but, as circumstances change, those who can change with
them will have to take a broad view of circumstances and understand rationally how best to adapt to them.
Newman and Helmholtz agree that, if we want meaningful economic or
practical success, we must devote ourselves with true purity of intention to
the pursuit of “useless” knowledge. This claim resonates strongly in the honors tradition; it is a classic argument for the kind of liberal education that
many honors programs undertake to provide. A program that seeks to serve
all students will typically satisfy the general education requirement, and from
this necessity a broad set of honors values has arisen: that particular content
matters less than the mental exercise; that critical thinking and the life of the
mind are ultimate goals; and that honors education can leaven all sorts of different educational paths and careers. It is not just our mission statements and
brochures that are full of exhortations to excellence, but also our hearts. As
honors teachers, administrators, and scholars, we have an appreciation for the
habits of mind that transcend disciplinary boundaries, and we seek to help
students become the kind of independent thinkers who can not only do
research but also imagine and perceive the kind of particular projects that will
yield the most interesting results. We can accomplish these goals only
through an education that aims at more than a skill set or job training; we
offer an education that aims to encourage the growth of what Newman called
“an acquired illumination.”
We see bright students flourishing and growing thanks to honors education, a phenomenon that can be hard to explain to those unfamiliar with the
process. We may find that we need to translate the messages of both Newman
and Helmholtz into the quantitative dialect of assessment in order to share it
effectively, especially with those who have the power to shape the modern
university. We can try to translate the marvelous prose of Newman into
numerical terms, however imperfectly. When assessment does not offer proof
to justify our faith in honors general education programs, we should question
both the design of the studies that generated them and the effectiveness of our
curricula. If we find that our classes are not helping students achieve a true
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liberal education, we can take advantage of our NCHC connections to
improve our programs. We must be confident that our aims are well served
by the tools we use to achieve it if we are to remain true to these aims.
We can look back to the nineteenth century for arguments to marshal in
defense of honors education in the university. We can strive to help students
reach the intellectual and moral goal that different ages have named “practical wisdom,” “a liberal education,” or “critical thinking.” To do so we must
communicate the value of such an education in terms that will be well understood by those we seek to persuade. Only then will we be able to defend and
continue the long tradition that counts Helmholtz, Newman, and many other
luminaries among its followers. Honors students should pursue knowledge
for its own sake, however useless it may seem on the surface. This kind of
learning creates real intellectual growth and forms the minds of the great
thinkers, innovators, and citizens of every generation.
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